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The use of conservation easements has been increasing in the United States. However,
patterns of growth over time are different for individual states. Little is known on how
determinants of conservation easements interact with one another and affect the choice of
conservation approaches. The study objective was to analyze conservation easement trends and
examine underlying choice determinants in the United States. Panel data models were employed
to assess determinants of easement acres and contracts from 1995 to 2015. Findings revealed that
the northern United States has the most percentage of land area under conservation easements.
The growth in conservation easements was positively related to gross state products, land market
values, air quality, and land use, while it was negatively related to state population density,
conservation spending, easement duration and endangered species. Public policymakers would
use these findings to integrate easement efforts into local planning to meet conservation and
land-use objectives.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Dynamics of development and population growth have resulted in increasing
fragmentation, conversion, and parcelization of lands, thereby, drastically impeding the ability to
manage and maintain the benefits they provide. The world is losing open spaces for human
development at an alarming rate. Most of the development happens on private land. Agricultural
land in the United States has decreased about 20 % since 2001 because of the expansion of
nearby urban areas (Riitters and Costanza 2019). About 6,000 acres of open space are lost daily
due to residential and commercial use in the United States, a rate of four acres per minute (U.S.
Forest Service 2020). Development pressure has also increased land values and property taxes,
making it expensive for landowners to keep their land intact (Block et al. 2004). Conservation
easements have been one of the most used tools to protect ecosystem benefits (Gustanski and
Squires 2000).
A conservation easement is a voluntary legal agreement that transfers identified
individual property rights from a public or private landowner to an easement holder to protect
conservation values for certain duration or for perpetuity (Vizek and Nielsen-Pincus 2017). An
easement1 holder is a non-profit or government entity that holds land and the right to enforce the
provisions of the conservation easement “in trust” for the public good (Owley and Rissman
2016). A conservation easement allows a landowner to maintain property ownership but restricts

1

Easement in this research always refers to a conservation easement not others.

1

development that negatively impacts conservation. A conservation easement is appealing to
easement holders as it is less expensive than the outright purchase of the land (Shaffer et al.
2002). It protects natural amenities as current and future owners are bound to the easement’s
terms and conditions agreed upon by the easement originators (Gustanski and Squires 2000). The
easement also protects the economic and community benefits such as natural services, and land
and natural amenities that arise from the production of resources, products, goods, and services
(Sundberg 2013). Other influential factors for landowners entering into a conservation easement
on their property are preserving sense of place (attachment of people to a place), and societal,
cultural, and financial motives (Farmer et al. 2011; Miller et al. 2011; Merenlender et al. 2004).
Conservation easements have protected millions of acres of valuable wildlife habitat,
rivers, lakes, wetlands, oceans, and other open spaces from development and resource
exploitation (Rissman and Merenlender 2008). Farmland conservation easements have protected
some of the fertile soils and farmland in the United States, ensuring that they will be producing
food in the future. Conservation easements have also protected community character and
structure through community involvement, connections and networking (Horton et al. 2017), and
by limiting development, easements are saving taxpayer money on public infrastructure, and
other costs associated with unregulated sprawl as well as protecting economic impacts (Farmer et
al. 2011; Fishburn et al. 2009). A spatial model for three Maryland counties suggested that
having land under an easement increased surrounding property values which, in turn, increased
property tax revenue to a level sufficient enough to finance easements (Geoghegan et al. 2003).
If conservation easements are accurately valued to protect land with real conservation benefits,
then they will ensure that future generations enjoy open spaces and other ecosystem services by
preventing development and improving management of natural resources on the property.
2

Conservation easement might not be a good option for all landowners. To qualify for the
federal tax deduction, the conservation easement must be permanent. The restrictions in property
will remain for multiple generations to come. The future value of the property will likely be
diminished as a result of the restrictions of the easements. Also, not all land will qualify for a
conservation easement. Having a tax or financial circumstances may prevent landowners to enter
into an agreement with an easement holder.
With increased awareness of the importance of private lands to environmental
conservation efforts, the use of conservation easements as a conservation tool has increased
during the past three decades for national, state, and local land trusts (Farmer et al. 2011). The
number of acres protected under conservation easements by 2015 was 21 million, an 834%
increase from two million acres in 1995 (National Conservation Easement Database 2020). Also,
conservation easements have gained popularity internationally throughout Latin America,
Canada, Australia, and the Caribbean (The Nature Conservancy 2020). The growing use
reflected the widespread use of conservation easements.
Although there has been a dramatic growth in conservation easements in the United
States, this growth varies across states when measured in terms of change in the number of acres
protected and easement contacts over the years (Fishburn et al. 2009). Many external and internal
factors including socioeconomic, bio-physical, and legal and policy affect how conservation
easements conserve land (Yuan-Farrell et al. 2005). So far, little has been known on how these
factors interact with one another and affect what has been conserved or how it has been
conserved (Fishburn et al. 2009; Fishburn et al. 2009; Merenlender et al. 2004). Also, previous
studies have shown the urgency of implementing best practice guidelines for designing
easements and having a more comprehensive picture of what balance of conservation approaches
3

are desirable for managing conservation easements (Bastian et al. 2017; Fishburn et al. 2009). To
address these research gaps, a better understanding of the determinants of conservation
easements across the United States is necessary. Therefore, this study identified and described
factors leading to the variability of growth in conservation easements across the United States.
The study is the first of its kind to analyze determinants of conservation easements using a panel
data model for 49 states.
This research had three specific objectives:
Objective 1: Examine the general trends towards the use of conservation easement in the
United States.
Objective 2: Analyze the impact of different socioeconomic, bio-physical, and policy
factors on increasing conservation easements acreage.
Objective 3: Analyze the impact of different socioeconomic, bio-physical, and policy
factors on number of conservation easement contracts.

4

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Development in exurban and rural areas in the United States has proliferated since 1950
with an expansion of population after World War II (Brown et al. 2005). It is estimated that
urban land in the United States will increase substantially from 3.6% of the total land base in
2010 to 8.6% by 2060 (Nowak and Greenfield 2018). Development and parcelization of private
land cause habitat fragmentation; thereby, threatening biodiversity at all levels from ecosystems
to species (World Wildlife Fund 2018). A common approach used to control the extent and
location of the development is conservation easement acquisition (Gustanski and Squires 2000).
Conservation easements are being used globally by land trusts and government agencies as one
of the primary tools to achieve conservation goals on private lands (Fishburn et al. 2009). An
easement can keep the property in private hands and on the tax rolls; however, it also protects
specific conservation values of a property in accordance with the landowner and easement holder
objectives (Byers and Ponte 2005). As of 2015, around 21 million acres of land are under
conservation easements in the United States, a substantial increase from two million acres in
1995 (National Conservation Easement Database 2020). However, there is a spatial difference in
the growth of conservation easements among states (Merenlender et al. 2004). Bio-physical,
socioeconomic, and legal and policy factors influence the nature and number of conservation
easements within each state (Milder and Clark 2011; Fishburn et al. 2009; Gustanski et al. 2000).

6

Fishburn et al. (2009) studied how a proportion of conservation investments has changed
over time across the United States and for individual states by analyzing all conservation
easements and fee simple transactions made by The Nature Conservancy (TNC) in the 48
contiguous states between 1954 and 2003. They examined the balance of investments when
measured in terms of the area protected and upfront costs of protecting the land. They explored
the influence of six biological and socioeconomic variables using bivariate and multivariate
regression models. They found a highly significant positive relationship between year (1954 –
2003) and proportion of investments made as easements measured both in acres and dollars for
the United States. At a state level, they found spatial differences in the growth rate of easements.
The rate of growth of easements was high no matter how it was measured in states like Texas,
Utah, and Maine, whereas the rate of conservation easements decreased in both measures of
investment in Missouri. However, they could not identify consistent predictors explaining this
pattern. They suggested the need for a broader discussion on type and structure of conservation
approaches that work best in different ecological, socioeconomic, and policy contexts.
Albers and Ando (2003) studied whether the variation in the number of land trusts in
states across the United States could make economic sense i.e. cost and benefits by modeling the
number of land trusts actively engaged in conservation in each state in 1988 and 1998. They
highlighted two competing forces: spatial externalities in conservation that increase the
efficiency of having few land trusts and diversity in conservation goals leading to greater
efficiency in specialization and de-concentration. Using a random-effect negative binomial
model, they found that land price in a state had a significant positive relationship with the
number of land trusts. Similarly, the number of endangered and endemic species was
significantly and negatively correlated with the number of land trusts. So, the increase in the
7

number of endangered and endemic species decreased the number of land trust. Human
population density also had a significant negative influence in the study. On the contrary,
comparing the demographic characteristics of counties in Georgia with and without an easement,
Crehan et al. (2005) reported more land trust activities and easements in counties with higher
population densities, and mean incomes. So, these studies showed mixed influence of population
to the number of land trust. When the number of local and state land trusts increases, acres
protected by conservation easements also increase (Aldrich and Wyerman 2005). The study
suggested further empirical analysis to explore the relationship of these variables with
conservation agents and conservation activities.
Bastian et al. (2017) compared landowner (i.e., conservation easement suppliers) and
land trust (i.e., conservation easement demanders) motivations for entering into easements within
the western United States by using a stated choice survey and random utility model analysis.
Their results suggested that both landowners and land trusts were more likely to choose
conservation easements that were in perpetuity (permanent). However, the result was not
consistent with Miller et al. (2011) who analyzed factors impacting landowner willingness to
enter into a conservation easement in Wyoming and Colorado. They indicated that landowners
had concerns with permanent conservation easements. Bastian et al. (2017) reported a significant
and negative influence of public access for landowners and an insignificant negative influence on
land trusts. Overall, the result was consistent with other studies (Cropper et al. 2012; Miller et al.
2011). Bastian et al. (2017) also indicated that higher offered benefits (financial incentives)
positively impacted landowner as a supplier and negatively impacted land trust easement choice
as a demander. The result coincided with findings that landowners expect some financial support
for their contribution (Vizek and Nielsen-Pincus 2017; Miller et al. 2011), but that land trusts
8

also expect some level of sacrifice in terms of compensation from landowners (Cropper et al.
2012). The study suggested a need for addressing the potential balance between a landowner and
land trust. For this, land trusts should consider developing strategic plans with their conservation
priorities and community attachment to identify landowners with the same values.
Parker (2004) described the choice to conserve land with conservation easements using
time series and cross-sectional data from the Land Trust Alliance - a national conservation
organization representing land trusts across the United States. The study used regression analysis
to estimate the percent of acreage that land trusts controlled with conservation easements.
Results showed that trusts tend to hold easements when transaction costs are low, and gains from
landowner specialization are high. Most trusts preferred to preserve scenic views over large
parcels of agricultural land. Parker described the influence of increased state and federal tax
benefits to the landowners who transfer rights to trusts. He also identified the emergence of
model state legislation, which reflects legislative accommodation of land trusts. Land trust
reliance on easements increased most rapidly in states that subsequently adopted the easement
statute. This result was consistent with the notion that easement enabling statutes increased the
likelihood that courts will enforce conservation easements. In the study, provision for providing
forest amenities, rare species habitat, wetlands, and watersheds/water quality did not affect
acreage held in easements by land trusts.
Yuan-Farrell et al. (2005) studied the spatial distribution of easements as a conservation
strategy by surveying 117 land trusts in California and found that the distribution of easements
varied substantially among the 58 counties of California. Population density, developed private
land, and land market value were significantly and positively related to easement density,
whereas, endangered and threatened species were negatively associated with easement density.
9

They concluded that the large variance among counties could be due to easements being
implemented sooner i.e., having a long duration of conservation easement in some places than
others, as easements were comparatively new. This result could be generalized across states, as
some states implemented easement laws more promptly than others. This could create variation
in the growth of conservation easements across states.
Merenlender et al. (2004) reviewed the literature on the current attractiveness of
conservation easements to protect undeveloped land. They showed that little information was
available on patterns of areas and resources being conserved under conservation easements. They
also reported that studies reviewed offered little information on how conservation easements
work best in particular ecological and political settings. There are ample research on why
landowner participates in a conservation easement or what motivates landowner to enter into one
(Horton et al. 2017; Vizek and Nielsen-Pincus 2017; Brain et al. 2014; Cropper et al. 2012), and
these research tend to study landowner experience with a conservation easement and a land trust.
However, there is little information on which easement characteristics are attractive to
landowners.
Farmer et al. (2011) analyzed factors motivating private, non-industrial landowners who
placed conservation easements on their properties. They collected data on landowner property
characteristics, and factors related to their decision in Iowa, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin.
Results suggested that landowners were more likely to enter into an easement when substantial
financial benefits (tax incentives or direct payments) were provided. This finding indicated the
importance of financial incentives for landowners. States might differ in the provision of these
incentives, and some states may even lag in offering them (Milder and Clark 2011). States like

10

Colorado and Virginia, where state tax incentives are available, have the fastest rate of easement
growth in the United States (Aldrich and Wyerman 2005).
Although numerous studies have examined factors motivating landowners and land trusts
to enter into a conservation easement, there is a lack of research solely focusing on drivers of
conservation easements. Even if we consider those motivating factors as determinants of
conservation easements, how all these factors interact with one another and influence
conservation easement is unknown. Also, previous studies have focused on a particular
organization either the Land Trust Alliance or the Nature Conservancy looking to implement
conservation easements. The impact of combined factors covering a large-scale is still unknown.
A better understanding of variables that influence the creation and nature of conservation
easements is necessary to understand the growth patterns and to develop better conservation
approaches for conservation easement effectiveness.

11

CHAPTER III
METHODS
Study area
This study covered 49 states, including Hawaii and Alaska. Due to the insufficient data,
Rhode Island was excluded. States were classified into four geographic regions following the
Forest Service Resources Planning Act (RPA) regions (U.S. Forest Service 2014) to describe the
trend in the growth of conservation easement across regions. These regions are used by both the
RPA Assessment and the Forest Inventory and Analysis program. There were 19, 12, 5, and 13
states in North, Rocky Mountain, Pacific Coast, and South respectively.
Econometric model
Panel data model
The panel model endowed regression analysis with both spatial and temporal dimensions.
It analyzes the differences between individuals or firms, as well as changes within individuals or
firms over time. There are mainly three categories of panel models: pooled regression, variable
coefficient, and variable intercept. A pooled regression model assumes that the intercept and
coefficient of the model would not change with individuals and time. A variables coefficient
model assumes that an individual’s regression equation has a different intercept and coefficient.
A variable intercept model assumes that an individual’s regression equation has the same
coefficient but different intercepts to capture heterogeneity. The model assumes that the effect of
time-varying variables is not individually but collectively significant and has the property of
12

random variables-uncorrelated with all other included and excluded variables (Liu et al. 2018).
This study did not aim to model each state or year but to analyze the overall characteristics of all
states, so the variable coefficient model was rejected, and the variable intercept model was used.
A general panel data regression model to estimate a dependent variable was given in Equation
3.1 (Baltagi 2008):
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝒙𝒊𝒕 𝜷 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡

(3.1)

The disturbances followed a one-way error component model:
𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡

(3.2)

where i was cross-sections dimension and t was time-periods, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 was a dependent variable,
𝛼 was intercept term of individual heterogeneity, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 was an independent variable/regressor, 𝜇𝑖
was a cross-section specific effects and uncorrelated with the regressors, and, 𝑣𝑖𝑡 was an
idiosyncratic error (i.e., it varied with time and individuals).
A random-effect model was used to analyzed determinants of conservation easement
acres as there was no correlation between the unique errors and the independent variables (i.e.,
no endogeneity) (Greene 2012). The variable intercept model with a random effect is given in
Equation 3.3 (Baltagi 2008). Most variables were measured as logarithms since the logarithm of
the data would not change the nature and relationship of included variables and was helpful to
heteroscedasticity elimination.
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝒙𝒊𝒕 𝜷 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡

(3.3)

where, 𝜇𝑖 was a cross-section specific random effect and was constant through time.
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Count data model
The second dependent variable number of contract was a non-negative discrete variable,
so, the count-data model was used for estimation of determinants of the number of easements
contracts. The Poisson regression model, a non-linear model, has been widely used for such data.
The distribution with parameter 𝜆𝑖 took the following general form as in Equation 3.5 (Greene
2012):
𝑦

(exp(−𝜆𝑖𝑡 ))𝜆𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡
𝑓(𝑦𝑖𝑡 ) = Prob(𝑌 = 𝑦𝑖𝑡 ) =
𝑦𝑖𝑡 !

(3.4)

𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1, 2, 3 …
where,
E (𝑦𝑖𝑡 ) = 𝜆𝑖𝑡 and V (𝑦𝑖𝑡 ) = 𝜆𝑖𝑡 .
The Poisson regression model was given by
log 𝜆 = 𝑿𝛽,
where, 𝛽 can be estimated either by an iterative non-linear weighted least square method
or by maximum likelihood method. The Poisson model was assessed first. However, the
goodness of fit suggested the assumption that the mean of the dependent variable is equal to its
variance was not valid. Hence, the Poisson model was rejected. Usually, the preferred model in
such a case has been the negative binomial model, which allows for overdispersion (Aggarwal
2004; Albers and Ando 2003). The negative binomial model was derived from the Poisson
model by introducing the unobserved effect 𝑢𝑖𝑡 into the conditional mean 𝜇𝑖𝑡 such that
log𝜇𝑖𝑡 = log𝜆𝑖𝑡 + log𝑢𝑖𝑡
The negative binomial regression model takes the form:
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(3.5)

log𝜇𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝛽 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡

(3.6)

where, 𝑒𝑖𝑡 reflects a specification error or a cross-sectional heterogeneity and exp(𝑒𝑖𝑡 ) is
gamma-distributed.
One of the general forms of the negative binomial distribution is given in Equation 3.7
(Greene 2012):
(exp(−𝜆𝑖𝑡 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ))(𝜆𝑖𝑡 𝑢𝑖𝑡 )𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑓(𝑦𝑖𝑡 |𝒙𝒊𝒕 , 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ) =
𝑦𝑖𝑡 !

(3.7)

1

The distribution had mean 𝜆 and variance (𝜆 + ). Here, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 was the number of easement
𝜃

contracts in a state i during a year t, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = exp {𝒙𝒊𝒕 𝜷} 𝒙𝒊𝒕 was the matrix of independent variables
for state i during year t, and 𝜃 was the value of unobserved dispersion parameter. As the study
had a short panel (i.e. five-year panel), there could be a bias in the parameter estimates if a fixed
effect estimator is used, so a random effect negative binomial model was used (Greene 2012).
This estimator specified the distribution of the dispersion parameter to vary randomly among
1

states. The inversion of the dispersion parameter (

1+𝜃

) had a β (r, s) distribution, where r and s

were just incidental parameters.
The elasticity of different independent variables
In regression, the elasticity is the statistic measuring the relative impact of an estimated
parameter. It is the percentage change in dependent variable given a percentage change in an
independent variable. The elasticity for random effect model of Equation 3.3 is given by
Equation 3.8 (Greene 2012):
𝜕𝑦 𝑥
𝜕 ln 𝑦
(3.8)
)( ) =
𝜕𝑥 𝑦
𝜕 ln 𝑥
For the negative binomial model of Equation 3.7, elasticity is estimated by Equation 3.9:
𝜀𝑦,𝑥 = (

15

𝜀𝑧 = 𝛽𝑧 𝑧

(3.9)

where, z was the mean of the independent variable.
R 3.5.1 (R Core Team 2018) and Stata 15 (Statacorp 2017) software were used for the
analysis.
Variable description and data sources
From the reviewed literature, three categories of independent variables were identified to
explain the determinants of conservation easement acreage and the number of contracts (Table
3.1). The summary statistics of those variables are listed in Table 3.2. The survey years were
1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015. The first group of independent variables consisted of
socioeconomic characteristics, which was related to state social and economic factors. GDP was
the total gross domestic product of a state. Conservation efforts or investments made by states
largely depended on the state GDP (Fishburn et al. 2009; Crehan et al. 2005). States differed in
their GDP per capita as some states have high GDP than others. LMV was the total land market
value of a state. The impact of LMV was uncertain as some studies found positive impacts
(Yuan-Farrell et al. 2005; Albers and Ando 2003), and some found negative impacts (Fishburn et
al. 2009). POP was a population density of a state. TOLD was land development pressure,
measured by the change in household numbers in a state. DLAND was total acres of non-federal
land developed in a state. An increase in population and land development was perceived to
increase the number of conservation easements; however, Albers and Ando (2003) reported
negative impacts of population density. CS was the conservation spending of the Land Trust
Alliance.
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The second group consisted of biophysical characteristics, which were related to a state’s
environmental condition. NORTH, RM, PC, and SOUTH were dummy variables equal to 1 for a
state that falls in a particular region. ETS was the total number of endangered and threatened
species in a state. The influence of ETS was negative at a state level (Yuan-Farrell et al. 2005;
Albers and Ando 2003), but uncertain at the country level. FOREST was the share of forest land
area to the total land area in a state. An increase in forest area was perceived to increase
conservation easements. GINI was the toxic air exposure score for a state. With the rise in the
GINI score, it was assumed people be more conscious about the environment, thereby increasing
conservation activities. ETS, FOREST and GINI were time invariant.
The third group was legal and policy characteristics, which represented legislative
provisions of easement-enabling statutes in a state. HOLDER was change in the number of
conservation easement holders. When the number of holders increased, acres and contracts of
easements also increased (Aldrich and Wyerman 2005). ENACT was the duration of a
conservation easement law in a state. Easements being implemented sooner in some states than
others could create differences in conservation easement acres, as easements are relatively new
(Yuan-Farrell et al. 2005). TAX was dummy variable equal to 1 if a state has a provision of state
tax incentives for easement landowners; 0 otherwise. The effect of TAX was not consistent in
past studies. Vizek and Nielsen-Pincus (2017) reported a positive impact of financial incentives
to landowners; however, financial factors were the lowest-ranked motivation for landowners in
Farmer et al. (2011). PLAND was the total acres protected under the International Union for
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) in a state. PERP was dummy variable equal to 1 if the state has a
provision for holding a conservation easement in perpetuity, 0 otherwise. Landowners didn’t
prefer to enter into easements in perpetuity (Stroman and Kreuter 2014; Miller et al. 2011), but
17

easement holders with conservation goals had preferences for conservation easements with
contract lengths in perpetuity (Cropper et al. 2012). ENCT and PLAND were time-invariant
variables. Overall, the past research did not provide any expectations or direction for most of
these variables.
The research design is a panel data, and 49 states were included in the data set. Given the
availability of data, state-level data were collected from 1995 to 2015 over a five-year interval
i.e., 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015. GDP was retrieved from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (2018). LMV was obtained from the National Agricultural Statistics Service (2019).
POP and TOLD from United States Census Bureau (2019), NORTH, RM, PC, and SOUTH from
the U.S. Forest Service (2014), CS and PLAND from the Land Trust (2016a), and DLAND from
Natural Resources Conservation Service (2019). ACRE, HOLDER, CNTRCT were compiled
from the National Conservation Easement Database (2019). ETS data was collected from U.S.
Fish & Wildlife Service (2019). FOREST was obtained from the National Land Cover Database
(2019), and GINI was collected from Boyce et al. (2016). Legal and policy data for ENACT,
TAX, PERP were from Gustanksi and Squires (2000) and updates made along the time were
reviewed.
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Table 3.1

Variable definition and data sources included in the panel random effect and the
negative binomial model.

Variable
Dependent variables
ACRE
CNTRCT
Independent variables
Socioeconomic
GDP
LMV
POP
CS
TOLD
DLAND
Bio-physical
NORTH
RM
PC
SOUTH
ETS
FOREST
GINI
Legal and policy
HOLDER
ENACT
TAX
PLAND
PERP

Definition (source)
Changes in conservation easement areas in a state every five years from
1995 to 2015 (1,000 acres) (a)
Changes in the number of conservation easement contracts in a state every
five years from 1995 to 2015 (100) (a)
Gross domestic product of a state by survey years ($ billion; current value)
(b)
Total land value of a state by survey years ($1,000 / acre) (c)
Population density of a state by survey years (person / square mile) (d)
Conservation expenditure of land trusts in a state by survey years ($
millions) (e)
The pressure of land development, measured by the change in household
numbers in a state every five years from 1995 to 2015 (100,000) (d)
Change in the non-federal land area developed in a state every five years
from 1995 to 2015 (100,000 acres) (f)
1 if a state is in the North; 0 otherwise (g)
1 if a state is in the Rocky Mountain; 0 otherwise (g)
1 if a state is in the Pacific Coast; 0 otherwise (g)
1 if a state is in the South; 0 otherwise (g)
Number of endangered and threatened species in a state (h)
Share of forestland to total land area in a state (%) (i)
Toxic air exposure score of a state (GINI index) (j)
Change in the number of conservation easement holders in a state every five
years from 1995 to 2015 (a)
Duration of a conservation easement law in a state, measured as the
difference between 2019 and the enactment year (years) (k)
1 if a state has a provision of state tax incentives for landowners with a
conservation easement; 0 otherwise (k)
Land area protected under the International Union for Conservation of
Nature in a state (100,000 acres) (e)
1 if a state has a provision for holding conservation easements in perpetuity;
0 otherwise (k)

Notes: There were five survey years: 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015. Variables (ACRE, GDP, LMV, and PLAND) were scaled to natural
logarithm to generate interpretable coefficients in fitting the random effect model. Data sources were (a) National Conservation Easement
Database (2019), (b) Bureau of Economic Analysis (2018) (c) National Agricultural Statistics Service (2019), (d) United States Census Bureau
(2019), (e) Land Trust (2016a), (f) Natural Resources Conservation Service (2019), (g) U.S. Forest Service (2014), (h) U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Service (2019), (i) National Land Cover Database (2019), (j) Boyce et al. (2016), (k) Gustanski and Squires (2000).
North states are Connecticut (CT), Maine (ME), Massachusetts (MA), New Hampshire (NH), Vermont (VT), New Jersey (NJ), New York (NY),
Pennsylvania (PA), Delaware (DE), West Virginia (WV), Maryland (MD), Missouri (MO), Wisconsin (WI), Michigan (MI), Illinois (IL), Ohio
(OH), Minnesota (MN), Indiana (IN), Iowa (IA). Rocky Mountain states are North Dakota (ND), Nebraska (NE), Kansas (KS), South Dakota
(SD), Idaho (ID), Wyoming (WY), Montana (MT), New Mexico (NM), Arizona (AZ), Utah (UT), Colorado (CO), Nevada (NV). Pacific Coast
states are Alaska (AK), Washington (WA), Oregon (OR), California (CA), Hawaii (HI), South states are Florida (FL), Georgia (GA), North
Carolina (NC), South Carolina (SC), Virginia (VA), Alabama (AL), Kentucky (KY), Mississippi (MS), Tennessee (TN), Arkansas (AR),
Oklahoma (OK), Texas (TX), Louisiana (LA).
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Table 3.2

Summary statistics of variables used in the panel random effect and the negative
binomial model.

Variable
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Dependent variables
ACRE
0.02
1315.84
81.46
CNTRCT
0.01
82.37
4.35
Independent variables
Socioeconomic
GDP
21.60
2,558.17
304.60
LMV
0.30
14.24
3.26
POP
0.90
1,195.70
167.17
CS
0
185.84
6.89
TOLD
0.04
18.14
1.70
DLAND
0.07
8.27
1.46
Bio-physical
NORTH
0
1
0.16
RM
0
1
0.25
PC
0
1
0.27
SOUTH
0
1
0.32
ETS
4
118
29.37
FOREST
105.26
636.71
154.26
GINI
0.64
0.92
0.71
Legal and policy
HOLDER
0
311
9.06
ENACT
22
50
37.16
TAX
0
1
0.31
PLAND
0
5.32
0.40
PERP
0
1
0.49
Notes: S.D. was the standard deviation. The number of observations was 245.
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S.D.
132.32
7.78
371.39
2.85
222.49
23.62
2.43
1.55
25.72
77.30
0.10
22.85
6.83
0.88
-

CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
Trends in the use of conservation easements
The growth in conservation easement acres has accelerated in the past three decades as
landowners have become more concerned about the loss of open space, habitats, farmland, and
recreational spaces. There was a highly significant positive relationship between year and
easement acreage (ACRE = -129.03 + 0.10year; r2 = 0.49; p < 0.001).
The easement growth measured in terms of acres protected from 1995 to 2015 by region
and state is given in Error! Reference source not found. and 4.2. In 1995, acres held in a
conservation easement in the United States was 0.12 % (2,328,274 acres) compared with 0.93
(21,111,182 acres) in 2015. As of 2015, the most acreage occurred in the North (1.79%) and
Rocky Mountain (0.92%) regions, while the least acreage occurred in the Pacific Coast (0.38%)
and South (0.90%).
Within the North region, as of 2015 the most acreage was in Maine (10.69%), and least in
West Virginia (0.25%). Within the Rocky Mountain region, as of 2015, the most acreage was in
Montana (2.69%) and the least in Nevada (0.04%). Within the Pacific Coast region, as of 2015,
the most acreage was in California (1.58%) and the least in Alaska (0.03%). Within the South
region, as of 2015, the most acreage was in Virginia (4.53%), and the least in Oklahoma
(0.21%).
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At an individual state level, annual growth rate from 1995 to 2015 was determined. The
maximum increase at a state level was for Kentucky (44.06 %), and the minimum for New
Mexico (4.19 %). The median increase was for Colorado (14.82 %). The statistics were positive
for all states. The calculated annual growth rate for the individual state was shown on the map
(Error! Reference source not found.). The growth rate of easements had decreased in 2015 for
most states (e.g., In Colorado, growth rate from 2005 to 2010 was 77 %, whereas, the growth
rate was only 27.48 % from 2010 to 2015). These statistics showed that the trend towards greater
reliance on easements was broadly distributed in the United States.
Table 4.1

Acreage changes of land enrolled in conservation easements in the United States
by region and state from 1995 to 2015.

Geographic region
All
North (19 states)
Maximum
Median
Minimum
Rocky Mountain (12 states)
Maximum
Median
Minimum
Pacific Coast (5 states)
Maximum
Median
Minimum
South (13 states)
Maximum
Median
Minimum
Individual states
Maximum
Median
Minimum

Percentage of area under conservation
easement
1995
2015
0.12
0.93
0.19
1.79
2.67 NH
10.69 ME
0.11 HI
1.96 VT
0.00 WV
0.25 WV
0.14
0.92
0.48 MT
2.69 MT
0.03 ID, UT
0.58 ID, ND
0.00 AZ
0.04 NV
0.03
0.38
0.43 HI
1.58 CA
0.01 OR
0.76 WA
0.00 AK
0.03 AK
0.06
0.90
0.45 VA
4.53 VA
0.04 FL
1.03 AR
0.00 OK
0.21 OK
2.67 NH
0.04 FL
0.00 AK
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10.69 ME
0.95 SD
0.03 AK

Annual growth
rate
(1995 – 2015) %
11.65
11.11

10.89

11.29

11.43

Figure 4.1

Spatial distribution of the annual growth rate in acres enrolled in conservation
easements in the United States from 1995 to 2015.

The growth in conservation easement measured in terms of number of contracts is given
in Table 4.2. In 1995, number of conservation easement contracts in the whole United States
were 20,479 compared with 113,259 in 2015 with 4,639 contracts per year. As of 2015, more
number of contracts were made in North (76,303), and the least in the Pacific Coast (9,294).
Contracts per year from 1995 to 2015 was more for the North (2,989), the least in the Pacific
Coast (398).
Within the North region, as of 2015 the maximum number of contracts were made in
Wisconsin (14,836), and the least in Vermont (237). Number of contracts per year was most in
Maine (556), and the least in Vermont (10). Within the Rocky Mountain, as of 2015 the
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maximum number of contracts were made in Colorado (3,707) and the least in Nevada (32).
Number of contracts per year was most in Montana (169), and the least in Nevada (1). Within the
Pacific Coast, as of 2015 the maximum number of contracts were made in California (6,821) and
the least in Hawaii (38). Number of contracts per year was most in California (284), and the least
in Hawaii (1). Within the South, as of 2015 the maximum number of contracts were made in
Virginia (6,036) and the least in Oklahoma (353). Number of contracts per year was most in
Virginia (258), and the least in Oklahoma (17). These statistics showed the trend that states had
most contracts in 2015 for each region, they had the maximum contracts per year. New
Table 4.2

Number of conservation easement contracts in the United States by region and
states from 1995 to 2015.

Geographic region
All
North (19 states)
Maximum
Median
Minimum
Rocky Mountain (12 states)
Maximum
Median
Minimum
Pacific Coast (5 states)
Maximum
Median
Minimum
South (13 states)
Maximum
Median
Minimum
Individual states
Maximum
Median
Minimum

Number of conservation easement
contracts
1995
2015
20,479
113,259
16,513
76,303
5,150 WI
14,836 WI
344 ME
2,050 IL
13 WV
237 VT
1,343
12,527
433 MT
3,707 MT
21 NE, NM
710 ID, WY
1 ND
32 NV
1,317
9,294
1,124 CA
6,821 CA
68 OR
361 OR
7 AK, HI
38 HI
1,306
15,135
863 VA
6,036 VA
28 NC
786 MS
1 OK
353 OK
5,150 WI
79 MS
1 ND, OK
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14,836 WI
926 NC
32 NV

Contract per
year
(1995 – 2015)
4,639
2,989
556 MI
76 OH
10 VT
559
169 MT
24 ID, WY
1 NV
398
284 CA
14 OR
1 HI
691
258 VA
35 MS
17 OK
556 MI
42 KY
1 HI, NM

Number of conservation easements acres per contract was determined for geographic
region to see the trend (Error! Reference source not found.). Number of acres per contract was
increasing for all regions except Rocky Mountain. Conservation easement acres per contract for
the whole United States was 113.69 in 1995 as compared with 186.40 in 2015. For the North,
number of acres per contract was 48.38 in 1995 while 97.02 in 2015. For the Rocky Mountain,
number of acres per contract was 781.44 in 2015 as compared with 544.49 in 2015. Similarly for
the Pacific Coast, number of acres per contract was 133.67 in 1995 as compared with 232.52 in
2015. For the South, number of acres per contract was 232.66 in 1995 as compared with 312.27
in 2015. These statistics showed that contracts are not increasing with the rate of increase in
acres.
Table 4.3

Number of conservation easement acres per contract across geographic regions in
1995 and 2015.

Geographic region
All
North (19 states)
Rocky Mountain (12 states)
Pacific Coast (5 states)
South (13 states)

Conservation easement acres per contract
1995
113.69
48.38
781.44
133.67
232.66

2015
186.40
97.02
544.49
232.52
312.27

Impacts of different factors on increasing conservation easement acreage
Model fit and diagnostic test
The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) test was used to decide between random
effect regression and a pooled OLS regression. The null hypothesis stated that there were no
significant differences across units (i.e., no panel effect). The null hypothesis was rejected, and
the random effect regression model was used (χ2 = 18.48, p-value = 0.0002). To test for a fixed
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effect and random effect, the Hausmann test was used where the null hypothesis stated that the
preferred model was a random effect vs. the alternative fixed effect. As the obtained p-value was
greater than 0.05, the null hypothesis was failed to reject (χ2 = 11.71, p-value = 0.181). So, the
random effect model was used. The model fit was significant at < 0.001% significance level with
χ2 (18) = 128.80.
Diagnostic tests/ other tests were performed to evaluate model assumptions. The Durbin
Watson (DW) test revealed that there was no autocorrelation/serial correlation in the dataset
(DW value = 1.9). In the Breusch–Pagan (BP) test, we rejected the null hypothesis of
homoscedasticity. There was the presence of heteroscedasticity in the data set as the obtained pvalue was smaller than 0.05 (BP = 181.47, p-value = <0.0003). To account for
heteroscedasticity, a robust covariance matrix estimation was used. The corrected standard error
(S.E.) from the robust covariance matrix was included in the result (Table 4.4).
Results from the estimated coefficients and elasticities
Results from the final model estimation are presented in Table 4.4. Among six
coefficients in a socioeconomic category, four were significant. The coefficient for GDP and
LMV were positive and significant at a 1% significance level with an elasticity of 2.310 and
0.520, respectively. POP with an elasticity of -0.062 and CS with an elasticity of -0.056 were
significant at a 5% level or better. DLAND and TOLD didn’t show any significant effect. GDP
and LMV had a significant positive influence, whereas POP and CS had a significant negative
influence on the number of conservation easement acres.
Among the biophysical characteristics, GINI had a significant positive effect with an
elasticity of 0.517. ETS had a significant negative impact at a 1% level with an elasticity of 0.065. Geographic regions RM, PC, and SOUTH had a negative coefficient when a base
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comparison was with NORTH. GINI had a positive influence whereas ETS had a negative
influence on the number of conservation easement acres.
Of the five variables representing state legislatures, PLAND, PERP, and CNTRCT were
significant at a 1% level, while ENACT and TAX were not significant. The elasticity for
PLAND, PERP, and CNTRCT were 0.134, -0.038, and 0.014, respectively. PLAND and
CNTRCT had a positive influence whereas PERP had a negative influence on the number of
conservation easement acres.
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Table 4.4

Determinants of land acreage enrolled in conservation easements in the United
States from a panel data model with a random effect from 1995 to 2015.

Variable
Estimate
S.E.
S.E. (corrected)
Elasticity
**
Intercept
-23.358
5.556
4.342
Socioeconomic
Log(GDP)
0.927**
0.220
0.166
2.312
Log(LMV)
0.710**
0.221
0.194
0.520
**
POP
-0.383
0.099
0.111
-0.062
Log(CS)
-0.051**
0.023
0.019
-0.056
TOLD
0.05
0.049
0.024
0.008
DLAND
0.006
0.094
0.071
0.001
Bio-physical
RM
-1.460**
0.530
0.634
-0.347
PC
-0.498
0.604
0.812
-0.128
SOUTH
-0.669
0.549
0.702
-0.021
ETS
-0.023**
0.008
0.005
-0.065
FOREST
0.002
0.002
0.001
0.025
GINI
7.462**
1.939
1.813
0.517
Legal and policy
HOLDER
-0.065
0.041
0.044
-0.006
ENACT
0.008
0.026
0.028
0.028
TAX
0.087
0.347
0.329
0.003
Log(PLAND)
0.166**
0.050
0.054
0.134
**
PERP
-0.819
0.335
0.338
-0.038
CNTRCT
0.034**
0.013
0.022
0.014
Notes: S.E. was the standard error. The corrected S.E. was obtained after addressing
heteroscedasticity from the white test. The total number of observations was 245, covering five
years and 49 states.
**
Significance at 5% or better
Complementary to the elasticity at variable means as reported in Table 4.4, a more
comprehensive observation of the elasticity could be made by graphing the effects on linear
prediction (i.e., vertical axis) over the whole range of an independent variable (i.e., horizontal
axis). It was displayed for four variables (i.e., GDP, LMV, GINI, and PLAND) (Figure 4.2). The
slope of the curve was the elasticity of the variable on the horizontal axis. The upward trend of
the curves indicated a positive relationship between the independent variable and the prediction
probability of the conservation easement area. In contrast, a downward trend indicated a negative
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relation. Taking the variable of the LMV as an example, for all the observations, at the sample
mean (i.e., 7.5 and the dashed line in Figure 4.2), the slope of the curve was the elasticity for
LMV as reported in Table 4.4.

Figure 4.2

Impact of selected variables on the predicted probabilities of acres enrolled in the
conservation easements in the United States from 1995 to 2015.

Dash lines denoted the mean value of a selected variable. Selected variables were log (GDP) ($),
log (LMV) ($), GINI (index), and log (PLAND) (acres).
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Impacts of different factors on the number of easement contracts in a state
Model fit and diagnostic test
The likelihood ratio test suggested that the overall random effect negative binomial
model was significant (χ2 (15) = 129, p-value < 0.001). The test statistics was negative two times
the difference of the log-likelihood from the Poisson model and the negative binomial model, χ 2
(01) = 156.97 with an associated p-value of < 0.0001. This large test statistics suggested that data
was over-dispersed and not sufficiently described by the Poisson distribution. Incidence Rate
Ratios (IRR) [i.e., exp (β)] were calculated to facilitate the interpretation of variables included in
the model. The final set of variables, IRR, their corresponding elasticity, and standard errors
(S.E.) are presented in Table 4.5.
Results from the estimated coefficients and elasticities
Among the 15 variables regressed in the model, 11 variables had a positive impact,
whereas four variables had a negative effect on the number of easement contracts (Table 4.5).
IRR was used to interpret the result. If the IRR is 1.50, then a percentage point increase in an
independent variable would increase the count by 50 % when all other variables are at their
means. IRR exceeds one for the variable having a positive relationship with the dependent
variable.
Among the six variables representing socio-economic characteristics, GDP, LMV, and
TOLD were positively significant at a 10 % level, while CS was negatively significant at a 5 %
level. With a one million dollar increase in GDP, there was an increase of 55 % in the number of
CE contracts. LMV seemed to be the most important variable resulting in a 75-76 % increase in
the number of contracts when LMV was increased by 1000 dollars. The effect of CS was
negligible.
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Of the five variables representing bio-physical characteristics, only two variables (ACRE
and FOREST) were significant. An increase of 10 acres in ACRE was associated with a 16 %
increase in the number of contracts. Of the four variables representing legislative characteristics,
only ENACT (at 1% level) and PLAND (at 10% level) were significant. An acre increased in
PLAND led to a 14% increase in the number of contracts.
Table 4.5

Determinants of the number of conservation easement contracts in the United
States from the negative binomial model with a random effect from 1995 to 2015.

Variable
IRR
S.E.
Elasticity
Intercept
0.490
0.905
Socioeconomic
GDP
1.556*
0.241
0.152
*
LMV
1.755
0.321
0.210
POP
1.035
0.060
0.077
*
CS
0.001
2.909
-0.056
TOLD
1.033*
0.019
0.075
DLAND
1.023
0.041
0.045
Bio-physical
ACRE
1.163*
0.023
0.166
ETS
0.995
0.004
-0.187
FOREST
0.997*
0.001
-0.590
GINI
0.800
0.964
-0.215
Legal and policy
HOLDER
1.015
0.013
0.018
ENACT
1.041*
0.014
2.016
TAX
1.195
0.179
0.074
PLAND
1.144*
0.092
0.073
PERP
1.165
0.189
0.101
0.524
𝒍𝒏(𝒓)
4.851
𝒍𝒏(𝒔)
Log-likelihood
-1572.4
Wald χ2
129.1
Notes: IRR was the incidence rate ratio. The number of observations was 245, covering five
years and 49 states. The inverse dispersion parameter had a β (r, s) distribution, where r and s
were just incidental parameters.
*Significance at 10% or better
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Complementary to the elasticity at variable means as reported in Table 4.5, make a more
comprehensive observation of the elasticity could be made by graphing the effects on linear
prediction (i.e., vertical axis) over the whole range of an independent variable (i.e., horizontal
axis). It was displayed it for four variables (i.e., GDP, LMV, ACRE, and PLAND) (Figure 4.3).
The slope of the curve was the elasticity of the variable on the horizontal axis. The upward trend
of the curves indicated a positive relationship between the independent variable and the
prediction probability of the number of contracts. In contrast, a downward trend showed a
negative relation. Taking GDP as an example, for all the observations, at the sample mean (i.e.,
0.256 and the dashed line in Figure 4.3), the slope of the curve was the elasticity for GDP as
reported in Table 4.5.
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Figure 4.3

Impact of selected variables on the predicted probabilities of the number of
easement contracts in the United States from 1995 to 2015.

Dash lines denoted variable means on the horizontal axis. The selected variables were GDP ($
million), LMV ($ 100), ACRE (acres), PLAND (acres).
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
In recent years, conservation easements in the United States have been gaining
popularity. As of 2020, it is estimated that 40 million acres nationally are preserved by
conservation easements. This is more acreage than exists in national parks in the lower 48 states.
To help understand the distribution and variation of conservation easements, the impact of
different factors on the growth of conservation easements was analyzed in terms of acres
protected and the number of easement contracts. Trends of conservation easements was also
examined across geographic regions and selected states using area protected as a comparison
metric.
There are numerous works looking at factors affecting landowner and land trust
preferences and motivations for conservation easements at different scales. However, there was
little in the way of literature on national level factors influencing conservation easement growth
at any scale. Therefore, the comparisons of this study results were made with those studies about
landowners and land trusts.
Growth of easements by area and number of contracts has continued to rise
exponentially. Different organizations have used conservation easement to protect property, but
their popularity started to increase in the 1970s (Kiesecker et al. 2007). As of 2005, the
American Pacific Coast was the fastest-growing region in terms of the number of acres protected
(Aldrich and Wyerman 2005). In our study, the South emerged as the fastest-growing region,
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nearly tripling acres held under easements in five years from 2010 to 2015. This high demand for
conservation easements in the South could be linked to high participation in nature-based
recreation (hunting, fishing and wildlife watching), and more marginal and private lands, further
supported by to protection favorable environmental policy [e.g., Farm Bills, The Endangered
Species Act 1973 (ESA)].
Across states, the growth rate in the easement acres varied from 4% to 44 %. This
variation was explained by the impact of associated factors. States with the slow growth rate
were in mostly in Rocky Mountain and North. There is more potential for states in the South and
Rocky Mountain to increase conservation easements. States in these regions still have relatively
less acreage under easements.
States that had least percentage of area under conservation easements including OK, AK,
AZ, and WV had high annual growth rate. North and Rocky Mountain had relatively more
percentage of area under conservation easement but had a low annual growth rate. This could be
associated with a high marginal cost for enrolling additional easement acreage. The cost for a
new easement transaction would be high if a state already had more private land under
easements. Another region might be these regions that have more percentage under easements
have reached a saturation stage where they have no available space for further conservation
easement enrollment. This study recommends future research in this aspect.
The study result of a decreased easement growth rate in 2015 was consistent with the
finding that easements under the Land Trust Alliance and The Nature Conservancy have
decreased with an increase in government funding for other working land programs (Parker and
Thurman 2011). Another explanation might be those easement holders, which have focused
mostly on acquiring new conservation easements in past years, are now shifting their focus in the
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management of easements they hold. The Land Trust Alliance had spent approximately one
billion dollars in implementation and management (for monitoring, stewardship, legal defense,
enforcement, and operations) of easements compared to about 695 million dollars spent in land
acquisition from 2010 to 2015 (Land Trust Alliance 2016b). This was further supported by a
significant negative influence on conservation spending (CS). Wallander (2019) reported that
conservation spending of easement programs was steady while working land programs
conservation spending increased from 1996 to 2017. The negative sign on CS might also indicate
that the rate of increase in land market value was higher than the rate of increase in CS made by
easement holders.
In our study, GDP was found to have a positive impact on the growth of easements.
States with high GDP might invested more in conservation programs, or they would give more
donations to a conservation program. This was consistent with past research indicating the
importance of the state economy to land trust activities and conservation easements (Fishburn et
al. 2009; Crehan et al. 2005). However, an increase in conservation easement acres might
decrease the contribution of forestry and farm sectors to a state economy.
LMV had a positive impact on the growth of easements. The higher cost of land was
related to increased development pressure. Places facing high development pressure would have
a threat to save remaining open spaces and high demand for quality environmental factors. This
was further supported by a positive and significant parameter associated with air quality (GINI).
When air quality deteriorates in a locale, demand for an easement in that place increases, so areas
with high development pressure might invest more in conservation programs for a healthy
environment (Aldrich and Wyerman 2005). For a land trust, easements are more cost-effective
than the out-right purchase in places with higher land prices (Yuan-Farrell et al. 2005). However,
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some studies have suggested that conservation easements might not be cost-effective in areas
with the greatest developmental pressure due to externalities (Fishburn et al. 2009; Albers and
Ando 2003). Since the study analyzed general characteristics at the national level, it might not
represent the trend for a specific state or land use.
While past studies had highlighted the importance of protecting lands with a scenic view,
as well as ecological and historical significance (Cropper et al. 2012; Aldrich and Wyerman
2005; Parker 2004), we found a positive impact of PLAND in the growth of conservation
easements. Environmental objectives, including protection of wildlife habitats and natural and
historical places, have been critical objectives of farmland preservation programs in the United
States (Stroman and Kreuter 2015). This result also demonstrated the importance of easements in
maintaining a scenic landscape, habitat connectivity, and historical sites. Furthermore, this might
relate to a landowner’s obligation to protect such lands, which might be an essential driver in
land conservation.
A negative coefficient on the population density (POP) might indicate that easement
holders with ecosystem preservation goals consider high population density as a threat to their
objectives. Therefore, they would be looking for lands that provide ecosystem services away
from population centers. Also, densely populated areas might contain only a few land parcels for
conservation or parcels with limited conservation value (biological, ecological, social or cultural)
(Cropper et al. 2012; Albers and Ando 2003). On the contrary, some studies have reported more
land trust activities and easements in locales with high population density (Crehan et al. 2005;
Yuan-Farrell et al. 2005). The negative impact of threatened and endangered species (ETS) could
be linked to the public perceptions that these endangered species are to be protected by federal
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and state regulations and conservation activity. Thus, there is no need for private conservation
efforts.
Usually, land trusts were found to choose conservation easements that were in perpetuity
for their long-term goal of ecosystem conservation (Bastian et al. 2017; Cropper et al. 2012).
Landowners indicated concerns with permanent conservation easements as they don’t want to
impose their decision on their descendants and therefore they are not sure if they would like a
conservation easement or not (Stroman and Kreuter 2015; Miller et al. 2011). In our study, PERP
was negatively related with ACRE and was statistically significant. This implied a negative
influence of perpetual duration. Landowners and easement holders would have different
preferences or choice for making decision. So, conservation easements should be drafted such
that they compile all relevant laws, carry out landowner intent, and provide easement holders
with the flexibility needed to administer easements consistent with their conservation objectives
considering a changing condition. This could potentially increase the volume of easement
transaction.
States enacted easement statutes in different years, and they varied in the provisions they
allowed for conservation easements to protect lands (Gustanski and Squires 2000). Places, where
easement statutes were implemented sooner, had more easement acres than other sites (YuanFarrell et al. 2005; Parker 2004). A positive sign on ENACT supported the notion that states with
a long duration of easement laws had more easement acres. In previous studies, federal and state
tax incentives were considered one of the main drivers for a landowner to choose an easement
(Bastian et al. 2017; Farmer et al. 2011; Parker 2004). Thus, TAX was expected to have a
significant impact on easement growth. However, it was statistically not significant in our study.
It might be that landowners do not highly prioritize financial incentives as a motivation to enter
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into an easement agreement. Landowner receiving economic returns from the land was less
likely to place an easement except for absentee landowner who does not consider financial
incentives to place an easement (Farmer et al. 2015).
This study had a few limitations. First, conservation easement related data were collected
from the National Conservation Easement Database (NCED). Data represent the whole United
States but might not cover nationwide real easements number status since not all easements are
recorded in the database. Second, the rest of the data were retrieved from different sources.
Those data were collected with different objectives and at different times. Third, functional
forms of independent variables were changed for both General Linear Model (GLM) and
Maximum Likelihood (ML) models to ensure a better model fit.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
In recent decades, conservation easements have emerged as one of the widely used tools
for open space preservation. The study categorized different factors that might have influenced
the growth of conservation easements in a state. A panel data analysis of 49 states over 20 years
(1995-2015) suggested consistent predictors explaining the spatial differences in the growth of
easements across the states. The increase in conservation easements across states was positively
related to gross domestic product, land market value, air quality, forest area, and land use. In
contrast, the growth was negatively related to population density, conservation spending,
easement duration, and endangered species in a state.
The result of the study provided a broader picture of how we should structure and what
combination of different socioeconomic, bio-physical, and legislative factors is desirable to
increase the volume of easement transaction as well as the efficiency of an existing easement.
The study explored the legal characteristics of an easement, including duration, financial
incentives, and land use that were considered attractive to landowners.
Empirical evidence from the study has several implications. It would help easement
holders and landowners with a clearer understanding of factors influencing conservation
easements, providing them with opportunities to successfully negotiate an agreeable
conservation easement. This could increase the number and quality of conservation easements
resulting in an increase in acreage under conservation easement at more efficient market value,
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thereby improving overall market efficiency. Findings from the study would assist policymakers
as they are responsible for allocating scarce resources for land conservation and land use
planning. Public policymakers would be able to use these findings to review decisions on
conservation funding (e.g., farm bill) as well as integrate conservation easement efforts into local
plans to better meet public conservation and land use objectives. Conservation outcomes could
be changed by considering the factors identified in this study. If public policymakers identified
that landowners do not prefer a perpetual easement, they might consider changing easement laws
to address the potential balance between landowners and easement holders.
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